In [12] we defined an extensional notion of relative lawlessness and gave a classical model for a theory of lawlike, arbitrary choice, and lawless sequences. Here we introduce a corresponding intuitionistic theory and give a realizability interpretation for it. Like the earlier classical model, this realizability model depends on the (classically consistent) set theoretic assumption that a particular ∆ 2 1 well ordered subclass of Baire space is countable.
§1. Introduction.
1.1. Background . Infinitely proceeding sequences of natural numbers are the fundamental objects of L. E. J. Brouwer's intuitionistic theory of the continuum. Choice sequences are generated by more or less freely choosing one integer after another; at each stage, the chooser may also specify restrictions on future choices (compatible with previous restrictions, if any, and with the indefinite continuation of the process).
Brouwer called "lawlike" or "a sharp arrow" any sequence all of whose values are completely determined (restricted) according to some fixed law at some finite stage in the generation of the sequence. G. Kreisel [9] called "lawless" any sequence for which (i) "the simplest kind of restriction on restrictions is made, namely some finite initial segment of values is prescribed, and beyond this, no restriction is to be made." Kreisel and A. S. Troelstra developed a theory of lawlike and intensionally lawless sequences, based on (i), for which they were able to prove that every formula without free lawless variables is equivalent to one without any lawless variables and hence "it is possible to regard lawless sequences as a 'figure of speech'." 2 Alternatively a sequence could be called lawless if (ii) it successfully evades description by any fixed law. The assumption that lawless sequences are real objects of the intuitionistic continuum, whose properties are determined by their relationship to the lawlike sequences as suggested by (ii), leads to an entirely extensional theory of lawlike, general choice, and lawless sequences reminiscent of the theory of generic real numbers. 3 A classical model for such a theory appears in [12] , under the classically consistent assumption that a particular ∆ 2 1 well ordered subclass of Baire space is countable. The class of "definably lawless sequences" studied there satisfies Kreisel's Axiom of Open Data (suggested by (i) above) and a strong continuity principle (but not bar induction) and is a comeager subset of the continuum. In another paper (now in preparation) we show that it has classical measure zero and is simply definable in terms of a notion of forcing.
This paper introduces intuitionistic theories of definably lawless sequences incorporating S. C. Kleene's fundamental axiomatization FIM [8] of Brouwer's theory of the continuum and extends Kleene's function realizability interpretation of FIM to the new systems under the set-theoretic assumption appealed to in [12] . Whenever possible the reasoning used is constructive; however the realizability of some of the new axioms will be established only classically.
Motivation.
Before discussing lawless sequences in context (ii) we need to know something about the lawlike ones. According to [6] Kleene did not introduce a special type of lawlike sequences because the class of general recursive functions was adequate for his purposes and was definable in his theory. Here we need a broader interpretation of "lawlike" which we shall try to motivate constructively.
What assumptions can reasonably be made about all lawlike sequences?
2 [15, p. 639] . Kreisel [9, p. 225] asserts however that the equivalence result is not to be interpreted in this way, but rather as "a complete analysis of all known properties of lawless sequences in the given context."
3 The context of this theory is somewhat wider than Kreisel and Troelstra's since it includes arbitrary choice sequences as well as lawlike and lawless ones; however, some of the axioms concerning properties specific to lawless sequences will be restricted to the narrower context.
We propose the following:
1. If P (x, y) is a definite property of ordered pairs of natural numbers such that for each x there is exactly one y which makes P (x, y) true, then there is a lawlike function φ such that for all x, y :
φ(x) = y if and only if P (x, y).
2. The class of all lawlike sequences is countably infinite in the classical sense, but has no lawlike enumeration.
For (1) we accept as "definite" only properties P all of whose sequence parameters are lawlike, and whose constructive and classical meanings essentially coincide modulo Markov's Principle. Subject to this restriction P may involve quantification over all choice sequences and over all lawlike sequences, as well as over the natural numbers.
As in [12] we next define a notion of "lawless" relative to any given notion of "lawlike" satisfying (1) and (2). One possibility would be to adopt (ii) as the definition, so a sequence α is lawless if for no lawlike sequence φ and for no natural number x is it the case that λt α(x + t) is φ; however then α might be lawless even though e.g. λt α(2t) was lawlike. This objection suggests something like "α is lawless if and only if for each lawlike injection φ , α • φ satisfies (ii)." What we seem to need for the proofs is a stronger notion of "lawless" whose definition and key properties appear in Section 3.
1.3. Sources. This paper is intended to be a direct sequel to Kleene and Vesley's [8] and may be read independently of all other sources. However anyone interested in the subject should surely read Kreisel's [9] and consult Kreisel and Troelstra's [10] . One may also wish to consult [12] , although there the viewpoint was classical, the formalization cumbersome, and the presentation uneven.
Especially since the publication twenty-five years ago of Kleene's and R. E. Vesley's metamathematical investigation [8] , much effort has been devoted to axiomatizing parts of intuitionistic mathematics beyond number theory. Troelstra's and D. van Dalen's two recent volumes [15] , taken together with Vesley's address [16] to the 1979 Kleene Symposium, provide an excellent guide to the history and current state of this work. In particular, Chapters 4 and 12 of [15] give the background of Kreisel and Troelstra's work on lawlike and lawless sequences; Chapter 12 also describes other special classes of choice sequences which have recently been studied by Troelstra, van Dalen, G. F. van der Hoeven, and others. §2. The formal theories.
2.1. The basic theory BD. This will be an extension of Kleene's basic formal system B for the common portion of intuitionistic and classical analysis [8, . The main syntactic difference is that BD has two sorts of variables for functions, i.e., choice sequences of natural numbers; in the intended interpretation, one sort ranges over lawlike (or definable) sequences and the other over arbitrary choice sequences. 4 We use the letters a, b, c, d, e, g, h (with or without subscripts) to denote variables over lawlike sequences, and i, j, k, l, m, . . . , i 1 , . . . as number variables. As in [12, 8] α, β, γ, . . . , α 1 , . . . denote variables over arbitrary choice sequences.
The language includes the numerical equality constant = , Church's λ, a finite list f 0 , f 1 , . . . , f p of constants for primitive recursive functions, and the logical constants &, ∨, ¬, ⊃, ∀, ∃ . Each f i expresses a function f i (x 1 , . . . , x k i , α 1 , . . . , α l i ) which, considered as a function of x 1 , . . . , x k i , is primitive recursive uniformly in α 1 , . . . , α l i . In particular, f 0 is 0 , f 1 is , f 2 is + , and f 3 is · ; see [8] and [7] for a suitable list.
Terms and functors are defined as in [8] Prime formulas are of the form s = t where s, t are terms. Formulas are built up from these using the propositional connectives, and the quantifiers ∀x, ∃x, ∀a, ∃a, ∀α, ∃α over all three sorts of variables. A D-formula is one having free no arbitrary function variables. If u, v The substitution lemma (Lemma 3.1 of [8, p. 12] The new logical rules and axiom schemata needed are
For 9D and 12D, the a (which is varied in the rule) is not free in C. For 10D and 11D, g is any D-functor free for a in A(a).
Using these we can easily derive, for all formulas C, A(α) such that a is not free in C ⊃ A(α), α is not free in C, and a is free for α in A(α) :
As in [12] we follow Kleene's conventions for coding finite sequences of numbers and functions, although our notation differs slightly from his.
5 Here x 0 , . . . , x k−1 abbreviates i<k p
st prime; (m) i is the exponent of p i in the prime factorization of m; α 0 , . . . , α l−1 is λt α 0 (t), . . . , α l−1 (t) (similarly with ( ) instead of ); and (α) i is λt(α(t)) i . We follow Kleene in writing α(x) for the standard code α(0), . . . , α(x − 1) for the sequence of the first x values of α.
6
If w codes a finite sequence, its length is the number lh(w) of non-zero exponents in the prime factorization of w and for each i < lh(w) the (i + 1)st term of the sequence is (w) i − · 1. The code for the concatenation of finite sequences with codes u and v is u * v, and u * α is the infinite sequence defined by Here [ ] will be given a different meaning. 6 The notationα(x) for (α(0), . . . , α(x − 1)) is seldom used.
Seq(w) is an almost negative formula expressing the primitive recursive predicate Seq(w), "w is the code of a finite sequence of numbers," and α ∈ w abbreviates α(lh(w)) = w. The primitive recursive coding functions are among the initial functions f 0 , . . . , f p and their properties are assumed formally. For future applications we assume the characteristic functions of the primitive recursive predicates T (e, α, a, x, y), T 1 (e, w, z, x, y) and U (y) are among the initial functions.
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We adapt the number-theoretic postulates and recursion equations for the initial functions f i of [8, pp. 14, 19ff .] to the current situation by writing x, y, z in place of a, b, c. Similarly with Kleene's postulates concerning functions: x 0.1. {λx r(x)}(t) = r(t).
For x 0.1, r(x), t are terms such that t is free for x in r(x). For x 1.1 and x 2.1, x and y are distinct number variables and x is free for α in A(x, α).
A formula is nearly negative if it contains no ∨ and no ∃ except in parts of the form ∃xP, ∃aP, ∃αP with P prime, and ∃a∀x a(x) = t where t is a term not containing a free; almost negative if it is nearly negative and contains no ∃a∀x a(x) = t. Note that ∃!yB(y), ∃!aB(a) and ∃!αB(α) are almost negative if B is prime, and then ∀x∃!yB(x, y) is almost negative as well.
For each nearly negative D-formula A(x, y) in which a and x are free for y we take as an axiom
For any nearly negative D-formula A(x, a) in which x is free for a it follows that
The Replacement Theorem (Lemma 4.2 of [8] ) now holds with "x 1 , . . . , x n , a 1 , . . . , a m , α 1 , . . . , α l " in place of "x 1 , . . . , x n , α 1 , . . . , α m " in the version for formulas. As in Lemma 4.3 of [8] each term, functor and formula has a normal form (without superfluous λs).
Lemmas 5.3 and 5.5 of [8] now have additional lawlike parts. Thus for Lemma 5.3, if y, z are distinct number variables, a is any lawlike function variable, and p(y), q, r(y, z), and r(z) are D-terms not containing a free, with a and y free for z in r(y, z) and r(z), then (a) ∃a∀y a(y) = p(y).
∃a∀y a(y) = r(a(y)) and ∃a∀y a(y) = r(ã(y)). Lemma 5.5 extends to allow definitions of lawlike functions by cases, combined with primitive or course-of-values recursion, provided the case descriptions are nearly negative D-formulas. As an example, for nearly negative D-formulas Q 1 , Q 2 not containing a free and D-terms r 1 , r 2 :
The last axiom schema of BD is the "Bar Theorem" in Kleene's form
. Here A(w) and R(w) may be any formulas satisfying the obvious restrictions on the variables α, x, w, s. Observe that R is assumed to "bar" all choice sequences, not just the lawlike ones.
The theory BDLS
− . We now extend BD by adding axioms for lawless sequences. Here "DLS(α)" abbreviates a specific almost negative formula of the language of BD having free only the arbitrary function variable α; this formula will be given explicitly in the next section. ( We purposely leave open the possibility of later interpreting "DLS(α)" as primitive, or as an abbreviation for another formula of this or an expanded language.) As in [12] , [α, β] is the sequence defined by
Similarly [α 1 , . . . , α n ] is the sequence obtained by meshing α 1 , . . . , α n . For future reference we introduce also the projection functions
for 0 ≤ i < k and any n. These notions have the obvious formal equivalents.
The class of restricted formulas is defined by induction as follows. Prime formulas are restricted. If A, B are restricted, x is a number variable, and a is a definable function variable then A & B, A ∨ B, ¬A, A ⊃ B, ∀xA(x), ∃xA(x), ∀aA(a) and ∃aA(a) are all restricted. If A(β, γ 1 , . . . , γ n ) is restricted and contains free no arbitrary function variables but β,
The axioms for lawless sequences are then
For x DLS3 − A(α) is restricted and nearly negative and contains free no function variables but α. For x DLS4 − A(α, x) satisfies the same conditions and in addition e, α, y are free for x in A(α, x).
The intuitionistic theory IDLS
− . Kleene's basic theory B and his intuitionistic theory FIM differed only by a single continuity axiom, "Brouwer's Principle for Functions" [8, x 27.1] . Similarly, but with an important difference: IDLS − comes from BDLS − by adjoining the axiom schema we call "Kleene's Principle for Functions:"
for all nearly negative formulas A(α) and all formulas B(α, β) where α, β must be distinct arbitrary choice sequence variables. 9 An immediate consequence is "Kleene's Principle for Numbers" for A nearly negative and τ, y, α free for x in B(α, x) :
Kleene observed in [8, p. 74 ] that the special case * 27.4 of x KL1 in which A(α) is ∀x σ(α(x)) = 0, with the additional assumption that σ is a spreadlaw [8, p. 56] , follows from Brouwer's Principle for Functions; he also showed [8, p. 80, * 27.16 ] that * KL2 (hence x KL1) fails if A(α) is not required to be nearly negative.
Two important consequences of x KL1 are * KL3. ∀a∃βB(a, β) ⊃ ∃τ ∀a[∀x∃!yτ ( x * a(y)) > 0 & ∀β[∀x∃yτ ( x * a(y)) = β(x) + 1 ⊃ B(a, β)]] and the corresponding consequence * KL4 of * KL2, both proved by taking the nearly negative formula ∃a(a = α) as the A(α). Since DLS(α) will be almost negative, we conclude that in IDLS − every function completely defined on either the species of all lawlike functions or the species of all lawless functions is continuous on that domain, though it may have no continuous extension to B. 
Because of the "near negativity" condition and the absence of lawlike sequence parameters in x DLS3
− and x DLS4 − , IDLS is not an entirely satisfactory intuitionistic theory of lawlike, choice and lawless sequences, yet it is the strongest system whose consistency will be established in this paper. The "near negativity" condition can in fact be relaxed somewhat without strengthening the axioms, and lawlike parameters are harmless when held constant in deductions (cf. §4).
Sidestepping almost negativity.
A formula is feebly assertive if it is nearly negative or obtainable from nearly negative formulas using only disjunction and existential number quantification; mildly assertive if lawlike existential quantification is also allowed. A formula is assertive if it is nearly negative or obtainable from nearly negative formulas using only disjunction and existential quantification. In IDLS − we can prove the extensions * DLS5, * DLS6 of x DLS3 − , x DLS4 respectively to restricted feebly assertive A(α) with no sequence variables but α free, and the realizability interpretation will also establish the consistency of the forms with mildly assertive A.
x KL1 cannot consistently be similarly extended. For a counterexample let A(α) be ∀xα(x) = 0 ∨ ¬∀xα(x) = 0 and B(α, β) be (β(0) = 0 ⊃ ∀xα(x) = 0) & (β(0) = 0 ⊃ ¬∀xα(x) = 0). §3. Lawlessness relative to D.
3.1. The informal notion. Let N be {0, 1, 2, . . .} and B be Baire space N N . Assume D is a given subclass of B which is closed under relative recursion; we think of D as the class of lawlike sequences.
If β ∈ B maps sequence numbers to sequence numbers, β is called a predictor. If γ, δ ∈ B and δ(n) = 0 if γ(m) = n for all m, µm(γ(m) = n) + 1 otherwise then δ is called the converse of γ. A sequence γ is strongly lawlike if both γ and its converse are lawlike.
A sequence α ∈ B will be called lawless (relative to D) if for each lawlike predictor π and each strongly lawlike injection γ, there is an x so that
Here α • γ can be thought of as a subpermutation of α, so α is lawless if and only if every lawlike predictor is eventually correct (and hence very often wrong) on every strongly lawlike subpermutation of α.
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Note added in proof: A simpler, but equivalent, definition of "lawless (relative to D)" appears in [13] .
A finite list of sequences α 0 , . . . , α k−1 is independent if [α 0 , . . . , α k−1 ] is lawless. This convention, which was also used by Michael Fourman in [4] , is incompatible with Kreisel and Troelstra's strongly intensional treatment of lawless sequences; however, it greatly simplifies the extensional theory.
All the lemmas of Section 1 of [12] hold for the present notion. We summarize them here, providing constructive proofs (modulo Markov's Principle, for the finite injury priority argument for Lemma 4) of the density lemmas. (b) If α 0 , . . . , α k−1 is an independent list, then each α i is lawless, and if 0 ≤ i < j < k then α i and α j are independent. If α is lawless so is k [α] i for each k ∈ N and each 0 ≤ i < k.
(c) If α is lawless, so is λy α((x, y)) for each x ∈ N.
(d) If w is any sequence number and α is lawless then w * α is lawless. Proof. By Lemma 1(d) we need only produce one lawless sequence β. Let T = {τ 0 , τ 1 , . . .} be an enumeration of D 3 which is recursive in the given enumeration of D. Call a triple τ = ((τ ) 0 , (τ ) 1 , (τ ) 2 ) good if (τ ) 0 is a predictor and (τ ) 1 is a strongly lawlike injection with converse (τ ) 2 .
Call a triple τ nice at w for n when both w and (τ ) 0 (w) are sequence numbers and if p = lh(w * (τ ) 0 (w)) and m = max(n, max{(τ ) 1 (i) : 0 ≤ i < p}) + 1 then for each 0 ≤ i < j < p :
and for each 0 ≤ j < m :
Observe that niceness (unlike goodness) is effectively decidable, and τ is good if and only if τ is nice at every sequence number w for every n. By induction on k we define x k , w k , n k (with n 0 < n 1 < · · ·) and β(n k ) as follows. For convenience set n −1 = 0. In general, let x k be the least x ≥ 0 such that for all 0 ≤ j < n k−1 , (τ k ) 2 (j) ≤ x. (In particular, x 0 = 0.) Let w k be the sequence number of length x k such that for each i < x k :
13 Troelstra's distinction between lawless and protolawless sequences is lost here.
If τ k is not nice at w k for n k−1 , let n k = n k−1 + 1 and
The reader may verify that if τ k is nice at
Lemma 3. (Uniformity Lemma.) If α is lawless, π is a lawlike predictor, and γ is a strongly lawlike injection, then for each x 0 ∈ N there is some x ≥ x 0 such that Proof. Assume α is lawless relative to D, and let T be as in the proof of Lemma 2. Call a triple τ α-nice at w for n if τ is nice at w for n, and if i < lh(w * (τ ) 0 (w)) and (τ ) 1 (i) = 2q then (w * (τ ) 0 (w)) i = α(q) + 1. We define β in stages.
Stage 0. Let n 0 = 0 so β(n 0 ) = = 1. For notational convenience set n −1 = 0.
In general, at the conclusion of stage m we have n 0 < n 1 < · · · < n m and values β(n m ). For k ≤ m we say β(n k ) is permanent at m if for each j ≤ k either (i) for some sequence number w ≤ m, τ j is not nice at w for m, or (ii) for some s ≤ m, if w = [α, β(n k ) * λt 0] • (τ j ) 1 (s) and p = lh(w * (τ j ) 0 (w)) then τ j is α-nice at w for m and for each i < p: if (τ j ) 1 (i) = 2q + 1 then q < n k and (w * (τ j ) 0 (w)) i = β(q) + 1. Observe that in this case
Stage m+1:
If n k < m+1, (re)define n k+i = n k +i and β(n k+i ) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , m+1−k.
Observe that β(n k ) is permanent at m + 1 in this case. Case 2. Otherwise, set n m+1 = n m + 1 and β(n m ) = 0. Relative to α and T the construction is effective and for each k ≤ m one can decide effectively whether β(n k ) is permanent at m. By Markov's Principle with Lemma 3 and the lawlessness of α, for each k there is a stage at which β(n k ) becomes permanent, and if τ k is good then
If u is any sequence number then [α, u * β] is lawless by Lemma 1, and the proof is complete.
3.2. The formal predicate. In the language of IDLS (or IDLS − ) we may express "α is lawless relative to D" by the almost negative formula
where
and
The assumption "D is countable" may be expressed formally by ∃δED(δ) where
We do not assume this formally. Eventually we will consider the weaker assertive assumption ∃δED − (δ) ("D is weakly countable") where
3.3. Consistency questions. By [12] , under the assumption of a certain (classically consistent) set-theoretic axiom there is a classical model, with countably many lawlike sequences, for a theory DLS of which the current BDLS is (modulo notation) a proper subsystem. 15 Thus BDLS + ∃δED(δ) is classically consistent.
To verify the constructive content as well as the consistency of IDLS − and IDLS it is natural to look for realizability interpretations analogous 14 Note that ∃d Inv(c,d) economically expresses "c is a strongly lawlike injection." 15 DLS omits the "!" in x 2.2!D − and the requirements of near negativity from all axioms, strengthens x DLS4 − and asserts the countable axiom of choice for the class of lawlike functions. The classical model naturally fails to satisfy x KL1.
to the one developed by Kleene in [8] for FIM. The next section provides a classical function-realizability interpretation for each of the new systems, relative to a defined class D of "lawlike" sequences, under the assumption that D is countable. §4. The realizability interpretations.
Definition of D.
Let E 0 (x, y), E 1 (x, y), . . . be an enumeration of all nearly negative D-formulas having free no number variables except the distinct variables x and y; in particular let E 0 (x, y) ≡ a(x) = y. For each i let
The primitive recursive function symbols λ, 0, , +, ·, . . . , f p , = will have their standard interpretations. If a 0 , . . . , a k−1 is the (possibly empty) list of the distinct variables occurring free in F i in order of first free occurrence, and if A ⊂ B and φ ∈ B and ψ 0 , . . . , ψ k−1 ∈ A, we say that E i defines φ over A from ψ 0 , . . . , ψ k−1 if and only if, when number variables range over N , definable function variables over A, and arbitrary function variables over B and a 0 , . . . , a k−1 are interpreted by ψ 0 , . . . , ψ k−1 :
(i) F i is true classically, and (ii) for x, y ∈ N : φ(x) = y if and only if E i (x, y) is true.
We say E i defines ϕ uniformly over A if and only if for all ψ 0 , . . . ,
Now let Def(A) be the class of all φ ∈ B which are definable over A by some E i, from some ψ 0 , . . . , ψ k−1 ∈ A. Let
and for limit ordinals λ :
We want this induction to close off at a countable ordinal. The key is to observe that ζ∈OR D ζ has a natural definable well-ordering. In general, if ≺ well-orders A, and φ, ψ ∈ Def(A), set φ ≺ * ψ if and only if either (i) φ, ψ ∈ A and φ ≺ ψ, or (ii) φ ∈ A and ψ / ∈ A, or (iii) φ / ∈ A, ψ / ∈ A, and ∆ A (φ) < ∆ A (ψ), where ∆ A (φ) is the smallest tuple (i, ψ 0 , . . . , ψ k−1 ) in the lexicographic well-ordering < of N ∪ k>0 (N × A k ) determined by < on N and ≺ on A such that E i defines φ over A from ψ 0 , . . . , ψ k−1 .
Now let
Then ≺ is a definable well-ordering of D. In fact, both D and ≺ are ∆ 2 1 definable over B.
The countability assumption.
We now assume that D is countable, in accord with Brouwer's assertion [1] (see also [3] ) that every well-ordered species is countable and with the discussion in Section 1.2 above. Levy [11] proved the classical consistency with ZFC (relative to ZF) of the assumption that every definably well-ordered subclass of Baire space is countable; hence our assumption is classically consistent as well as constructively plausible.
No enumerating function can itself be lawlike, since D is closed under recursive operations and if δ enumerates D then for no n ∈ N is λt([δ(t)] t + 1) = [δ] n . All we are assuming is that some enumerating function exists (i.e., that ∃δ ED(δ) is classically true) so the conclusions of the density lemmas hold.
4.3. Realizability/ D . Following Kleene, if τ, α ∈ B we say {τ }[α] is properly defined if and only if (t)(E!y)τ ( t * α(y)) > 0, and then Lemma 6. For each assertive formula E containing free only the variables Ψ and each appropriate Ψ:
(i) If E is realized-Ψ by some function ε then E is true-Ψ.
To each nearly negative formula E containing free only the variables Ψ there is a partial recursive function ε E [Ψ] = λtε E (Ψ, t) such that for each appropriate interpretation Ψ of the free variables:
is completely defined and realizes-Ψ E.
The proof is like that of Lemma 8.4 of [8] , with three new cases for (ii). In the case where E is ∀aA(a), let ε E [Ψ] be Λφ ε A(a) [Ψ, φ] . In the case where E is ∃aA(a) with A(a) prime, and Ψ is β, c, x, let
, where n is a Gödel number of the primitive recursive predicate P (φ, β, ς, x) expressed by A(a). And if E is ∃a∀x(a(x) = t) where t = t[Ψ, x] is a term containing only Ψ, x free, representing the primitive recursive function t [Ψ, x] 
Since the predicate DLS(α) is almost negative, in particular α is lawless relative to D if and only if DLS(α) is realized-α by some function ε, if and only if ε DLS(α) [α] realizes-α DLS(α). This fact will be crucial to the proof of the main theorem. Proof. We assume that Θ do not occur as bound variables in the given deduction Γ E. For each axiom E of IDLS − containing free only Θ, Ψ which is "new" (in the sense that it is not an axiom of FIM extended to the language of IDLS − ) we give a realization-Θ/ D function ϕ = λΨ ϕ[Ψ] = λΨλtϕ(Θ, Ψ, t) partial recursive in Θ and finitely many functions from D.
Assuming that a realization-Θ/ D function ϕ exists for each premise of a new rule of inference, and that no variable in Θ is varied in the use of the rule, we give a realization-Θ/ D function ϕ for the conclusion. x DLS1
− and x DLS2 − are almost negative, and true by the density lemmas with the countability assumption, so Lemma 6 provides recursive realization functions for them.
The realizability-Θ/ D of x DLS3 − will be established by induction on the logical form of the nearly negative restricted part A(α), which we now allow to contain free lawlike sequence variables (parameters) from Θ. Without loss of generality suppose Θ consists of c,d, which are interpreted respectively by γ, δ ∈ D, and suppose z is the only other variable free in A(α) (so Ψ consists of z alone). 1. A(α) is s = t, where s expresses s(α, γ, δ, z) and t expresses t(α, γ, δ, z). Since s and t are primitive recursive the (representing function of the) predicate s = t has a Gödel number e from α, γ, δ. Let ξ A (α, z, σ) µxT 1,1,1 1 (α(x), γ(x), δ(x), e, z).
If σ realizes-α, γ, δ, z DLS(α) & s = t then α ∈ DLS and s(α, γ, δ, z) = t(α, γ, δ, z) is true, so ξ A (α, z, σ) is defined appropriately. Proof. Realization-Θ/ D∪{δ} functions must be provided for the axioms, and for the conclusions of the rules of inference (given realization-Θ/ D∪{δ} functions for the hypotheses). Since we have not altered the definition of "ε realizes-Ψ E," lawlike function variables still range over D so by Theorem 1 we need only check the rules of inference and the new axioms. The rules present no problems, and the new axioms can be handled with the help of the density lemmas.
x DLS1. ϕ = ΛwΛσ(Λ ψ 1 [w], (ε DLS(α) [ψ 1 [w] ], λt 0)) realizes the axiom, where ψ 1 is recursive in δ by the proof of the first density lemma.
x DLS2. ϕ = ΛαΛσΛwΛρ(Λ ψ 2 [α], (ε DLS ([α, β])[α, ψ 2 [α]], λt 0)) realizes the axiom, where ψ 2 is recursive in δ by the proof of the second density lemma.
